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 In this paper, we examine the dual role that social 
movement organizations can play in altering organiza-
tional landscapes by undermining existing organizations 
and creating opportunities for the growth of new types of 
organizations. Empirically, we investigate the impact of a 
variety of tactics employed by the Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU), the leading organizational 
representative of the American temperance movement, 
on two sets of organizations: breweries and soft drink 
producers. By delegitimating alcohol consumption, 
altering attitudes and beliefs about drinking, and 
promoting temperance legislation, the WCTU contributed 
to brewery failures. These social changes, in turn, created 
opportunities for entrepreneurs to found organizations 
producing new kinds of beverages by creating demand 
for alternative beverages, providing rationales for 
entrepreneurial action, and increasing the availability of 
necessary resources. • 
 One of the foundational tenets of institutional theory is that in 
order to prosper, organizations must be congruent with their 
institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and 
Scott, 1983), their structures and services aligned with the 
“cultural-cognitive belief systems and regulatory and normative 
structures that prevail in a given organizational community” 
(Baum and Rao, 2004: 51). Such alignment promotes the 
success and survival of organizations by increasing the 
commitment of internal and external constituents to 
organizations and their activities, allowing them to obtain 
necessary resources (Stinchcombe, 1965; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). By extension, the viability of organizational populations 
also depends on the extent to which the structures and 
activities that defi ne the population are in line with the 
demands and expectations of the institutional environment 
(Hunt and Aldrich, 1998; Lee and Pennings, 2002). 
 It is easy to focus on the conceptual machineries of 
institutions (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Hinings and Tolbert, 2008) 
and forget that defi nitions of reality, of how things should be 
done, have their foundations in the actions of individuals and 
groups (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Leblebici et al., 1991; 
Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Historically, social movement 
organizations have played a critical role in reshaping such 
defi nitions (Turner and Killian, 1987), producing some of the 
most signifi cant cultural changes in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, including the abolition of slavery, the 
extension of voting and other political rights to women, formal 
elimination of racial segregation, and the creation of 
protective legislation for the environment (McAdam and 
Scott, 2005). Research suggests that most of the enduring 
consequences of social movement organizations arise 
through their effects on organizations, either by changing 
policies and practices of extant organizations (Davis and 
Thompson, 1994; Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998; 
Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri, 2007) or by giving rise to new 
forms of organization (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Lounsbury, 
Ventresca, and Hirsch, 2003; Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 
2008; Swaminathan and Wade, 2001; Rao, 2009). For 
example, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) showed how Progressive 
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reform organizations contributed to the diffusion of civil 
service procedures that signifi cantly changed municipal 
governments, while Sine and Lee (2009) documented the 
impact of environmental movement organizations on the 
founding of new forms of power-producing organizations. 
 Other recent studies have also considered how broad, 
large-scale social movements can facilitate the emergence of 
new sectors and organizational forms. Schneiberg (2002) 
linked social movement activity to the formation of new forms 
of insurance companies; Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri (2007) 
demonstrated the effects of Progressive-era movement 
organizations on the emergence of new types of thrift 
organizations; and Lee (2009) examined the effects of the 
organic food movement on the rise of alternative forms of 
food production. But quantitative research in this area has 
often relied on proxies of general social movement effects 
(Haveman and Rao, 1997; Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008) 
and has not fully considered how the different tactics social 
movements use can destabilize extant sets of organizations, 
unintentionally support the founding of new types of 
organizations, and thus shape inter-population dynamics. Little 
research has directly linked particular social movement 
activities to changes in the institutional environment and to 
organizational outcomes, including the decline of existing 
organizational forms, the spread of new forms, and relations 
between new and old forms. 
 To understand the effects of social movement organizations’ 
activities, it is useful to examine them in relation to the three 
conceptually distinct dimensions of the institutional 
environment—normative, cognitive, and regulative (Scott, 
2001). The normative dimension refers to explicit espousals 
of particular organizational practices, structures, and forms by 
individual or collective actors who have recognized expertise 
or credibility (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Davis, 2007; 
Sine, David, and Mitsuhashi, 2007). Most studies examining 
this dimension have focused on established actors, such as 
professional or industry associations, that provide credentials 
or endorsements of specifi c organizational arrangements (e.g., 
Baum and Oliver, 1991; Scott et al., 2000; Sine, Haveman, 
and Tolbert, 2005; see also Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). 
But social movements can also be normatively powerful 
advocates. For example, movements for corporate social 
responsibility have encouraged investors to boycott 
companies (King, 2008), lowered investors’ confi dence in 
public corporations (King and Soule, 2007), and persuaded 
consumers to purchase wood from companies that use 
environmentally sound foresting methods (Bartley, 2007). 
 The cognitive dimension of the institutional environment 
involves taken-for-granted assumptions of the utility and thus 
the appropriateness of organizational practices or forms 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). As Suchman 
(1995: 581) noted, this dimension is the “most subtle and 
powerful” infl uence on organizations. Social movements may 
try to infl uence this dimension through “teach-ins” or other 
similar activities; these are particularly common among 
student movements (Soule, 1997; Rojas, 2006). But because 
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changing this dimension involves infl uencing deep-rooted and 
often non-conscious beliefs—bringing about such change is 
usually a slow and intensive process—social movement 
organizations typically focus their efforts on changing the 
normative and regulative dimensions. 
 The regulative dimension entails “rule setting, monitoring, 
and sanctioning activities” by powerful actors, such as the 
state, that have the ability to defi ne certain organizational 
practices and forms as acceptable and to enforce those 
defi nitions, often by constraining organizational resources 
(Scott, 1995: 35). This dimension is often the immediate 
target of social movement organizations (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977; Clemens, 1993; McAdam and Scott, 2005; Lee, 2009), 
perhaps in part because it can provide a foundation for 
changes in the other dimensions (Edelman, 1990; Schneiberg, 
2002; Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri, 2007), but the 
organizational consequences of regulatory changes are not 
always anticipated. For example, Perrata (2007) showed that 
anti-discrimination legislation, by promoting the value of 
gender equality, led to a sharp decline in both women’s and 
men’s colleges, though the women’s movement often 
supported the former. 
 Thus social movement organizations can change the cognitive, 
normative and regulative environments of organizations in 
several ways: by constructing and propagating shared beliefs 
that make some structures and behaviors acceptable and 
others unthinkable (Snow et al., 1986; Klandermans, 1997); by 
persuading public fi gures to endorse and promote these 
structures and behaviors (Turner and Killian, 1987); and by 
advocating for the passage of laws and regulations that 
promote new values and penalize activities in confl ict with 
them (Zald, Morrill, and Rao, 2005). Any of these activities can 
have intended and unintended effects. 
 In this paper, we investigate the intended and unintended 
effects of one social movement organization, the Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), on two organizational 
populations in the United States, breweries and soft drink 
manufacturers, between 1870 and 1920. During this time the 
WCTU grew from a small local organization to a major force in 
both state and federal politics, becoming arguably  the most 
powerful social movement organization in the late 1800s, 
creating a turbulent environment for alcoholic-beverage 
producers (Gusfi eld, 1986). As the WCTU worked to spread 
its anti-alcohol agenda, it had a dramatic effect on breweries, 
an intended target, but also, inadvertently, on soft drink 
manufacturers. Our paper documents the varied means 
through which the temperance movement of the late 
nineteenth century, and the WCTU in particular produced 
changes in social norms and beliefs about drinking, as well as 
in laws regulating the production and sale of alcohol, thereby 
deinstitutionalizing breweries and creating opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to found organizations producing new kinds of 
beverages as a substitute for beer and other alcoholic drinks. 
We describe the dramatic growth of the WCTU in the mid-
1800s and how it challenged one of America’s most accepted 
and cherished social activities, the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. 1 
1
The historical description below draws 
on the Minutes of the Convention of the 
National Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union, 1874–1920 (Chicago: Woman’s 
Temperance Publication Association), the 
Transactions of the American Medical 
Association, 1869–1882 (Philadelphia: 
Times Printing House), and the Journal of 
the American Medical Association’s 
“Proceedings of the House of Delegates,” 
1883–1920.
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 DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BREWERIES AND THE 
CREATION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES 
 European settlers brought customs and habits from the Old 
World, including regular consumption of alcohol, its 
customary use in social circumstances, and acceptance of the 
organizations that produce it (Jellinek, 1977; Gusfi eld, 1987). 
When the ship  Arabella , carrying the settlers of what would 
become the Massachusetts Bay Colony, dropped anchor in 
1630, its cargo included 10,000 gallons of beer, 120 
hogsheads of malt for brewing more, and 12 gallons of 
distilled spirits (Blocker, 1989). In addition to being a regular 
part of social occasions, alcoholic beverages were also a 
useful source of calories. Because fermenting enabled 
American colonists to store fruits and grains in beverage form 
throughout the year without spoilage, alcoholic beverages 
were also a form of liquid nourishment. Thus both beer and 
hard cider were commonly drunk at meals, social gatherings, 
and community events. 
 American society’s acceptance of alcoholic beverages was 
refl ected in the social role played by the breweries’ retail arm, 
the tavern (or saloon, in the West). These establishments 
became highly valued in politics, government, and business 
in the nineteenth century. When new towns became 
incorporated, the tavern was usually the only public structure 
and was therefore used as the city hall and courtroom as well 
as a place for business transactions (Asbury, 1950). Taverns 
served as very important settings for campaigning and lobbying 
as well. Political candidates and politicians frequented them, 
and elections were often won or lost with the free distribution 
of alcohol (Tyrrell, 1979). Political machines relied so heavily on 
taverns to keep constituents loyal to the party that in many 
cities it was said that the “most direct route to the city council 
or the state legislature [often] ran through the barroom” 
(Funderburg, 2002: 90). The growth of establishments selling 
beer and other forms of alcohol ballooned in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, and in 1909, their number exceeded 
the total number of libraries, schools, hospitals, parks, theaters, 
and churches (Cashman, 1981). 
 The brewery industry fl ourished throughout the nineteenth 
century, peaking at the turn of the century as the fi fth largest 
U.S. industry, with almost a billion dollars in sales (Chidsey, 
1969). Part of the industry’s success during this period can be 
attributed to increases in immigration, especially from Ireland 
and Germany, which led to a shift in consumers’ preferences 
from fermented fruit beverages to those made from cereals 
(Sechrist, 1986). In 1865, yearly per capita consumption of 
beer totaled a little over three gallons, but by 1900, per capita 
beer consumption had increased to sixteen gallons (Blocker, 
1989). 
 Although breweries and beer were accepted by most 
Americans from the time of the fi rst European colonies, there 
was always a minority who objected to the use of alcohol. 
One of the fi rst advocates in the U.S. of temperance was 
Increase Mather, who in 1673 penned the strong sermon, 
“Woe to Drunkards” (Mezvinsky, 1959). Widespread, 
systematic opposition to drinking, though, had its origins in 
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the religious revivalism of the Second Great Awakening in the 
early 1800s. One of the common threads that tied together 
various expressions of Protestant religious fervor of this 
period was a belief in the moral perfectability of humans, and 
excessive drinking, as a manifestation of moral imperfection, 
became a target of religious reformers (Szymanski, 2003). 
Concern with drinking as a social problem was also fueled by 
the connection between drinking and immigrant identity. 
Growing numbers of Irish and eastern European immigrants 
streamed into the U.S. throughout the nineteenth century, 
feeding nativists’ hostility. The regular use of alcohol became 
emblematic of these new immigrant groups; thus anti-
drinking sentiment was also driven in part by the broader 
tensions and confl icts associated with the social assimilation 
of different ethnic groups (Gusfi eld, 1955, 1986). An additional 
force that fed temperance sentiments during this period was 
the growing industrialization of the country, which increased 
demand for a dependable and tractable workforce. Many 
employers supported limits on alcohol use because they were 
concerned that the consumption of alcohol undermined 
employees’ thrift and hard work (Rumbarger, 1989). 
 All of these factors combined by the mid-nineteenth century 
to produce organized efforts to reduce the consumption of 
alcohol in the U.S. and several anti-drinking social movement 
organizations were founded in the U.S. before the Civil War. 
Most of these were relatively short-lived, however, as their 
cause was eclipsed by the more passionate debate over 
abolition. But because many of the same social conditions 
that fueled antebellum anti-drinking sentiments persisted 
after the war—tensions surrounding increasing rates of 
immigration, industrialization, concerns with the continuing 
improvement of society (as the religiosity of the early 1800s 
morphed into a more secular form, Progressivism)—the 
temperance movement began to grow once again in the late 
nineteenth century. Several social movement organizations 
developed to promote the aims of temperance, many of 
which actively collaborated and had overlapping 
memberships, but primary among these was the Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Movement. 
 Founding of the WCTU 
 What was to become one of the largest and most powerful of 
the anti-drinking social movement organizations was formed in 
1874 (Mezvinsky, 1959): the Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union, or the WCTU. In the spring of that year, three 
women—Jane Fowler Willing, Emily Huntington Miller, and 
Martha McClellan Brown—jointly issued a call to women at 
the National Sunday School Assembly in Chautauqua, New 
York, to attend the fi rst planned convention of the Woman’s 
Christian Temperance Union, aimed at mobilizing activist 
women to campaign for political candidates and legislation that 
favored temperance and women’s rights. In November of the 
same year, 135 women representing 16 states assembled in 
Cleveland, Ohio, to form the WCTU. Under the seventeen-year 
leadership of Frances Willard, who ascended to the presidency 
of the WCTU in 1879, the WCTU took aim at a variety of social 
problems, including campaigning for eight-hour work days, 
universal suffrage, industrial relations education, preschool 
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education, prison reform, world peace, equal rights for 
women, and greater penalties for crimes against women. The 
primary focus of the organization, however, was the 
promotion of temperance, which was viewed as an underlying 
solution (at least in part) to many of the other problems of 
concern to members (Gusfi eld, 1986). 
 The WCTU grew rapidly under Willard’s guidance. In 1879, 
the organization consisted of 1,118 local unions and 26,843 
members in 24 states; by Willard’s death at the turn of the 
century, it had grown to roughly 7,067 local unions with 
168,324 members in 52 states and territories—a 627 percent 
increase, during a period in which the U.S. population grew by 
198 percent. By 1921, the WCTU had 12,000 local unions with 
345,949 members in 53 states and territories. Membership 
required pledging both total abstention and commitment to 
the organization’s goals. Its success in membership growth 
was accompanied by fi nancial success as well. Its enormous 
size and wealth enabled the WCTU to employ a variety of 
tactics to try to achieve its primary objective, eliminating 
alcohol use in American society. 
 WCTU  Tactics 
 Changing the normative environment. One of the WCTU’s 
key tactics involved proselytizing temperance values and 
recruiting new members with an explicit commitment to 
abstain from alcohol use and to advocate a similar 
commitment among friends and family. To this end, the 
WCTU promoted countrywide tours by lecturers who sought 
to educate the public on the dangers of drinking and the 
benefi ts of abstention and who encouraged individuals to join 
the organization. Each member of the WCTU was required to 
pay annual dues to the organization and to take “The Pledge.” 
As written on the signed membership cards, individuals 
swore, “I hereby solemnly promise, God helping me, to 
abstain from all distilled, fermented and malt liquors, including 
wine, beer and cider; and to  employ all proper means to 
discourage the use of and traffi c in the same” [italics added]. 
Many members took this oath very seriously and led active 
personal campaigns against drinking as morally unacceptable. 
 Apart from the individual members’ evangelizing efforts to 
change the values and behaviors of their friends and family 
members, local WCTU chapters used a variety of tactics to 
create a normative environment supporting alcohol 
abstention. These included holding parades and soap box 
oratories denouncing the consumption of alcohol, gathering in 
front of saloons to sing hymns and to reprimand both patrons 
and owners, and giving away free ice water and lemonade at 
booths at county and state fairs—while simultaneously 
holding protests in front of brewery booths. Their tactics were 
loudly decried by opponents who claimed that the WCTU 
used “devices of a Methodist revival: by terrifying and rather 
coarsely emotional oratory from pulpit and platform; by 
parades of women and children drilled for the purpose; by a 
sort of persecution not stopping short of an actual boycott of 
prominent citizens inclined to vote wet” (United States 
Brewers’ Association, 1909: 40). But their tactics were 
effective. According to WCTU reports, such campaigns led to 
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a drop in malt liquor consumption between 1873 and 1875 of 
5,599,406 gallons and contributed to the failure of 750 
breweries (WCTU  Minutes , 1885). 
 The promotion of temperance norms by individuals and the 
collective challenges to organizations that distributed alcoholic 
beverages created a hostile normative environment for 
breweries. Breweries would have faced particularly hostile 
normative environments in states in which there were larger 
proportions of WCTU members because “in general, 
movements with a larger presence in the local 
community—as indicated by a larger number of adherents 
with mobilizable resources and by organized presence—are 
likely to make more demands on organizations for change 
than they are when they have little support in the local 
community” (Zald, Morrill, and Rao, 2005: 259). Thus, 
 Hypothesis 1a: Increases in the proportion of WCTU members in a 
state will increase brewery failures. 
 Other normative forces may have amplifi ed the effects of the 
WCTU on brewery failures (Skocpol et al., 1993). The WCTU 
often drew authoritative backing for its campaign from an 
organization culturally authorized to speak to matters of health, 
the American Medical Association (AMA). Not only was the 
AMA highly sympathetic to the temperance cause—and 
banned alcohol at its annual conventions beginning in 1877—
but physicians at the time were in direct competition with 
pharmacists, who often produced folk medicines containing 
homemade liquor as an alternative to doctors’ allopathic 
treatments (Sinclair, 1962). Contention over profi ts from 
medicines became so fi erce that in 1917, in response to a 
letter from the WCTU, the American Medical Association sent 
a resolution to the U.S. Senate stating that alcohol’s “use in 
therapeutics, as a tonic or a stimulant or as a food has no 
scientifi c basis; therefore be it resolved that the American 
Medical Association opposes the use of alcohol as a beverage; 
and be it further resolved that the use of alcohol as a 
therapeutic agent should be discouraged” (AMA  Transactions , 
1917: 11; quoted in Sinclair, 1962: 61). The AMA also issued 
many other resolutions that allowed the WCTU to weave 
arguments from AMA physicians about the deleterious effect 
of alcohol in with their own, often much more speculative 
assertions of the physical and moral consequences of alcohol 
use. Given the AMA’s status as a health authority and its 
support of the WCTU’s rhetoric and tactics, we predict that 
the WCTU’s normative effects on brewery failures will be 
amplifi ed in states with more AMA physicians: 
 Hypothesis 1b: Increases in the number of AMA members in a 
state will enhance the effects of WCTU membership on brewery 
failure. 
 The WCTU’s normative infl uence on brewery failures is also 
likely to have been affected by the percentage of surrounding 
states that had enacted prohibition laws. Researchers have 
found that legal changes in adjoining jurisdictions can affect a 
focal state in a variety of ways (Wade, Swaminathan, and 
Saxon, 1998). Because laws often indicate public support of 
certain morals and values, as adjoining states and counties 
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passed prohibitory regulation, residents of the focal state may 
have felt pressure to conform to the apparent growing 
acceptance of temperance values. We predict that the 
normative infl uence associated with the passage of state and 
county prohibition laws in adjoining states will amplify the 
WCTU’s normative effects on brewery failure in a focal state: 
 Hypothesis 1c: Increases in the percentage of adjoining states with 
prohibition laws will enhance the effects of WCTU membership on 
brewery failure in a focal state. 
 Changing the cognitive environment. Creating and 
propagating new cultural frames is a fundamental objective of 
social movements. If these frames are to become taken for 
granted, transmission mechanisms must be created that pass 
this knowledge to the next generation as a social fact (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966; Zucker, 1977, 1986; Tolbert, 1988; Fiss 
and Zajac, 2006). After witnessing the defeat of most local and 
state prohibition referenda in the 1870s, in 1879, the WCTU 
adopted a strategy to inculcate beliefs about problems of 
alcohol consumption into the curriculum of the nation’s public 
and private schools. Known as scientifi c temperance 
instruction (STI), the tactic called for the classroom “study of 
the nature of alcoholic drinks and narcotics, and their effects 
upon the human system, in connection with the several 
divisions of the subject of physiology and hygiene” (WCTU 
 Minutes : 1884, p. ixv). As Mary Hunt, the creator of STI, 
explained: “[Since] a government of the people cannot compel 
majorities, . . . [voters] must fi rst be convinced that alcohol and 
kindred narcotics are by nature outlaws, before they will outlaw 
them” (Zimmerman, 1992: 6). A subcommittee for hygiene 
textbooks examined and endorsed twenty-three textbooks 
from seven publishers for use in schools and colleges (Sinclair, 
1962). The WCTU then promoted these textbooks to schools 
and colleges throughout the country. Some of the claims made 
in these books include the following: 
 A cat or dog may be killed by causing it to drink a small quantity of al-
cohol. A boy once drank whisky from a fl ask he had found, and died 
in a few hours. . . . (Brands, 1883; cited by Sinclair, 1962: 45) 
 It often happens that the children of those who drink have weak 
minds or become crazy as they grow older. . . . (Brands, 1890; cited 
by Sinclair, 1962: 45) 
 Worse than all, when alcohol is constantly used, it may slowly 
change the muscles of the heart into fat. Such a heart cannot be so 
strong as if it were all muscle. It is sometimes so soft that a fi nger 
could easily be pushed through its walls. You can think what would 
happen if it is made to work a little harder than usual. It is liable 
to stretch and stop beating and this would cause sudden death. 
(Brands, 1890; cited by Sinclair, 1962: 45) 
 The WCTU actively sought to embed this curriculum into the 
public school system by legal mandates at the state level 
(Mezvinsky, 1961). Temperance Union women campaigned for 
pro-temperance education candidates, bombarded legislators 
with petitions, and helped write proposed instruction bills in 
committee. Michigan was the fi rst state to pass mandatory 
scientifi c temperance instruction in 1883; other states soon 
followed suit. The swift spread of STI partly refl ected the fact 
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that politicians and brewers did not view it as a threat—they 
were more concerned about prohibition laws than a trivial 
school course (WCTU  Minutes , 1885; Zimmerman, 1999: 23). 
By the 1901–1902 academic year, over 22 million students 
nationwide received scientifi c temperance instruction 
(Mezvinsky, 1961). This massive education effort directly 
affected students but also had indirect effects on parents. As 
the WCTU had hoped, the instruction did not stay confi ned to 
the classroom but spread to the entire community. Pupils took 
their new knowledge home and related to their parents what 
they had learned in school. This diffusion is demonstrated in a 
letter from a parent to a teacher that said, “My boy tells me 
that when I drink beer der overcoat vrom my stummack gets to 
thick” ( School Physiology Journal , 1896: 21; cited by 
Zimmerman, 1999: 25). 
 By altering general social understandings of and beliefs about 
the dangers and costs associated with alcohol use, insofar as 
STI was successful in changing the cognitive environment 
and thus reducing individuals’ propensity to consume alcohol, 
it should have had deleterious effects on organizations 
involved in the production and distribution of alcoholic 
beverages. Therefore we hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 2: State adoption of scientifi c temperance instruction 
will increase brewery failures. 
 Changing the regulatory environment. The WCTU strongly 
supported anti-alcohol laws as part of its overall change 
efforts. Declaring, “We hold prohibition to be essential to the 
full triumph of this reform” (WCTU  Minutes , 1875: 61), the 
organization formed the Committee on Temperance 
Legislation to lobby local and state legislators to enact alcohol 
licensing and prohibition laws. Alcohol licensing laws required 
alcohol producers to pay fees to operate, while state 
prohibition laws made the sale and transport of liquor within 
their state boundaries illegal. Prohibition laws clearly 
represented the strictest form of brewery regulation and 
became a tactic vigorously pursued by the WCTU at federal, 
state, and local levels. In an in-depth case study, Szymanski 
(2003) found that in Michigan the WCTU played a primary role 
in the passage of county and state prohibition laws. It 
succeeded in persuading numerous counties and states to 
pass such laws, and by 1918, 65 percent of the states and 
counties in the U.S. had banned alcoholic beverages. 
Temperance women’s efforts cumulated in the passage of 
the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, which 
banned the production and sale of intoxicating beverages in 
the United States of America beginning January 16, 1920. 
 Because law enforcement varied by governmental 
jurisdiction, the passage of prohibition laws did not always 
immediately lead to the disbanding of breweries, and some 
breweries survived for a substantial amount of time after the 
passage of county and state legislation. The United States 
Brewers’ Association even encouraged brewers to continue 
operating until state or local authorities could enforce the 
laws: “Absolute defi ance of the law by means of the wide-
open saloons which exists in nearly all of the largest cities, 
can scarcely be classifi ed as an evasion. It is simply a case of 
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public sentiment being stronger than action of Legislatures” 
(United States Brewers’ Association, 1911: 202). 
Nonetheless, regulatory change is likely to have taken a 
strong toll on breweries; thus we posit: 
 Hypothesis 3: The passage of prohibition regulation by counties and 
states will increase brewery failures. 
 Insofar as the tactics used by the WCTU produced changes in 
the normative, cognitive, and regulative environments of 
breweries, they fundamentally changed the competitive 
dynamics of the industry, reducing demand for breweries’ 
products and raising the costs of doing business. Although the 
manufacturers and purveyors of alcoholic drinks were direct 
targets of these tactics, they also had an inadvertent impact on 
another type of organization, one that fi rst emerged in the U.S. 
in the early nineteenth century, soft drink manufacturers. 
 Constructing Institutional Environments and 
Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
 Social movements can affect the likelihood of the emergence 
of new organizational forms through at least three mechanisms. 
First, they can motivate a class of entrepreneurs who share the 
movement’s values to develop alternatives that are more 
consistent with the movement’s values than current products. 
For instance, by promulgating alternative energy frames, 
environmental groups like the Sierra Club and the Audubon 
Society inspired a set of entrepreneurs to found novel wind 
electric power production facilities (Sine and Lee, 2009). These 
entrepreneurs actively create and promote product substitutes (a 
market push). Second, by motivating consumers to change their 
consumption patterns, social movement organizations create 
demand, or market pull for products that are consistent with 
alternative values and behaviors. For example, by criticizing 
the agricultural industry for its extensive use of pesticides, the 
organic movement convinced potential customers of the 
benefi ts of and need for pesticide-free agricultural products. This 
led to heightened demand for such products, to which a number 
of entrepreneurs—including those who had relatively little 
concern with environmental issues but who recognized a market 
opportunity—responded (Lee, 2007). Third, social movement 
organizations can encourage entrepreneurial activity (some-
times inadvertently) by encouraging shifts in resources from 
one set of activities to new activities. For example, the abolition 
movement ultimately led to the demise of plantations as a 
form of agricultural production; the presence of newly freed 
labor created by this demise helped fuel the growth of an 
alternative form of agricultural organization, share-cropping 
(Ruef, 2004). Although the WCTU’s activities were explicitly 
aimed at the alcohol-producing industry, they infl uenced 
entrepreneurialism in another industry, soft drink production, 
through each of these mechanisms. 
 Origins of the Soft Drink Industry 
 Just as the brewery industry was reaching the height of its 
societal acceptance and popularity in the early to mid-
nineteenth century, the genesis of a new organizational form 
was taking place throughout the country: the soft drink 
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company. Artifi cial mineral water, created by adding sodium 
bicarbonate to water, was fi rst mass-produced in England in 
1764 by Thomas Henry, a chemist and apothecary. Henry’s 
goal was to create a product that would aid in the treatment 
of such ailments as fever, scurvy, dysentery, and vomiting. A 
version of the product Henry created arrived in the United 
States in the early 1800s and was embraced by scientifi c and 
medical communities eager to experiment. An array of 
statesmen and scientifi c sympathizers, among them such 
notables as James Madison, John Adams, and Thomas 
Jefferson, promoted the benefi cial properties of carbonated 
water in papers presented in different venues, including the 
American Philosophical Society, the country’s fi rst and most 
prestigious scientifi c academy. 
 Commercial production in America began in 1807, with 
apothecaries using a wide variety of techniques to generate 
carbon dioxide from bicarbonate powders and to infuse the 
water with the gas. The 1850 U.S. census revealed 64 
manufacturers of carbonated water with $760,000 in annual 
sales. The industry grew slowly, with herbs and spices 
eventually being added to the water to increase its medicinal 
effects. An example of entrepreneurial activity in this industry 
is that of Asa Candler, a successful druggist in Atlanta, 
Georgia, who in 1886 was introduced by a fellow pharmacist 
to a mineral water tonic that used Peruvian coca leaf extract 
and African kola nuts for fl avoring. This new tonic, Coca-Cola, 
was touted as a pharmaceutical cure for a myriad of 
infi rmities, including headaches, exhaustion, hysteria, and 
drug addiction (Pendergrast, 1993). In a letter to his brother 
Warren, Candler described the product: 
 You know how I suffer with headaches. Well some days ago, a 
friend suggested that I try Coca-Cola. I did and was relieved. Some 
days later I again tried it and was again relieved. I determined to fi nd 
out about it—investigation showed that it was owned by parties un-
able to put it fairly before the people. I determined to put money into 
it and a little infl uence. I put $500 of the fi rst and am putting a goodly 
portion of what I have of the last. (Pendergrast, 1993: 44) 
 Candler bought the formula and created the Coca-Cola 
Company for the “buying of ingredients and appliances 
necessary therefore, and the sale of manufactured article, as 
a syrup in bulk, bottled, as a medicine, and as a nerve tonic” 
(Pendergrast, 1993: 43). It was not long before Candler and 
others began to recognize new opportunities created for them 
by the temperance movement. 
 The Effects of the WCTU on Entrepreneurial Activity 
 The WCTU’s efforts to delegitimate alcohol production and 
consumption through grassroots proselytization, scientifi c 
temperance instruction, and prohibitory regulation spurred soft 
drink entrepreneurial foundings in at least three ways. First, 
proselytizing by WCTU members created both a normative 
environment in which individuals felt pressure to provide 
alternatives to alcohol (a market pull) and one in which some 
entrepreneurs who subscribed to temperance values were 
inspired to promote them by providing such alternatives (an 
ideological push). Second, by both educating individuals about 
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the harmful effects of alcohol and legislatively restricting its 
availability, the WCTU’s strategies generated a market for 
alternative drinks, thereby attracting entrepreneurs who did 
not necessarily share the temperance movement’s values but 
who recognized a fi nancial opportunity (a market pull). Third, 
by delegitimating breweries and instigating their failures, the 
WCTU transformed the competitive landscape, thereby 
making resources available to both classes of entrepreneurs . 
 Ideological push . Some early soft drink producers identifi ed 
themselves from the start as temperance movement 
sympathizers. Driven by their ideologies, these entrepreneurs 
foresaw opportunities in untapped market segments that 
would fulfi ll their goals of enacting societal change while at 
the same time forming a profi table business venture. Moving 
forward, they successfully created an emerging market for 
temperance drinks using a number of techniques, such as 
advertising the beverages’ temperance qualities and 
distributing free samples of the new temperance-friendly 
products. The founding of the Hires Root Beer Company 
provides one example. The founder, Charles Elmer Hires, 
opened a drugstore in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, shortly after 
graduating from pharmacy and medical school. A devout 
Quaker and teetotaler, Hires wanted to develop a drink that 
would replace beer, the typical beverage of hard-drinking 
Pennsylvania miners (Funderburg, 2002). After discovering a 
recipe for a new drink while on his honeymoon, Hires 
returned to his pharmacy to experiment with 16 roots, herbs, 
and berries. Initially called root tea, the drink had little appeal 
among his target audience. Russell Conwell, then the 
president of Temple University, advised Hires that miners 
were more likely to drink a manly beer than an effeminate tea. 
Accordingly, Hires changed the name of the product from root 
tea to root beer and began marketing 25-cent packages of 
powder that yielded fi ve gallons of root beer when mixed with 
water, yeast, and sugar. After Hires gave out free glasses of 
root beer at the 1876 Centennial Exposition, consumers 
responded very positively, giving high marks to the robust 
fl avor. By 1884, he began selling his root beer in kegs, which 
became very popular as drink dispensers. Six years later, the 
Charles E. Hires Company was incorporated. 
 Market pull . As the nascent soft drink segment began to be 
seen as a lucrative opportunity, another kind of entrepreneur 
entered the scene, one who was not motivated by temperance 
values per se but, instead, was drawn into the emerging 
market by opportunities associated with changes in beverage 
consumption practices (Eckhardt and Ciuchta, 2008). As beer 
and other alcohol products became less desirable and/or harder 
to obtain, entrepreneurs saw an opportunity to change their 
marketing strategies and produce replacement beverages that 
could fi ll the void left by beer’s disappearance. 
 Though the WCTU enjoyed notable success in its efforts to 
reduce individuals’ consumption of alcohol (Feldman, 1927), the 
rituals and symbols associated with drinking were deeply 
entrenched in American society and did not disappear. Sharing 
alcoholic beverages was (and remains) a well-established part of 
marking special social occasions and signifying social solidarity 
and friendship. The key role of alcohol in social life is not easy to 
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quantify, but general evidence of this role can be found in a 
wide array of sources. For example, in Horace Greeley’s 
childhood memoirs, he notes that early nineteenth-century 
funerals were not considered adequate without the dispensing 
of “spiritual consolation,” and most gatherings of two or three 
neighbors for an evening’s chat normally involved the hospitable 
provision of beer or other alcoholic beverages (Greeley et al., 
1868: 99–100). Even the ordination of ministers often entailed 
sharing a drink, sometimes denoted as “ordination brew” 
(Tyler, 1944). The social role of alcohol is also suggested in 
various fi ctional works, ranging from Burns’ annually celebrated 
admonition to “take a cup o’ kindness for auld lang syne,” to a 
scene from Louisa May Alcott’s novel,  Little Women , written 
during the years of the temperance movement, which portrays 
a well-intended neighbor bringing bottles of wine to a wedding 
celebration. Thus both historical and fi ctional accounts 
demonstrate the deeply entrenched social signifi cance of 
sharing a drink in a range of social situations, from casual 
interactions among friends, and weddings and celebrations, to 
ritual religious activities. For special moments, water (or coffee 
or tea) was not enough; if the event was exceptional, then the 
drink had to be exceptional as well. 
 The social void created by the WCTU’s efforts to delegitimate 
alcoholic beverages created opportunities for products that 
could be used as alternatives to alcohol, and entrepreneurs 
quickly began to address that opportunity. That soft drinks 
were indeed used to fi ll the void is suggested by commentary 
from soft drink manufacturers at the time. For example, the 
chief executive offi cer of Hires Root Beer noted, “As nearly as 
we can estimate, the sales of root beer have increased three to 
four times over since the advent of prohibition . . .” (Feldman, 
1927: 79). Similarly, a study by Feldman (1927) on the effects 
of prohibition on soft drink manufacturers found that several 
manufacturers of ginger ale indicated that sales of their product 
more than doubled between 1913 and 1925, years during 
which the individual consumption of alcohol dropped markedly. 
 A good example of entrepreneurial efforts to capitalize on 
opportunities provided by the temperance movement is 
provided again by Asa Candler, the owner of the Coca-Cola 
Company. A few years after he founded the company, the 
temperance movement in Georgia pushed through the early 
enactment of STI and passage of local prohibition option laws. 
Candler recognized that Coca-Cola could increase its sales by 
altering its organizational identity from a pharmaceutical 
company to a producer of temperance-consistent leisure drinks. 
In 1895, he began running advertisements in newspapers that 
said “Drink Coca-Cola, the Great National Temperance Drink, 
Delicious and Refreshing” (Pendergrast, 1993: 66, 111). Candler 
used the term “soft drink” to distinguish Coca-Cola and other 
mineral water leisure drinks from drinks containing alcohol (hard 
drinks) (Pendergrast, 1993). The company’s transformation paid 
off handsomely: Coca-Cola sales increased immensely by the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
 As the temperance movement gained strength in the early 
twentieth century, soft drink entrepreneurs, including the 
founders of Dr. Pepper, Pepsi-Cola, and Moxie, continued to 
vaunt their products’ wholesome image, on one hand, while 
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trying to tap the demands of former drinkers, on the other. 
Thus, the  Soda Fountain , a soft drink industry trade journal, 
suggested that drink dispensers add a dash of pepper sauce 
and a sprinkling of salt, stir the drink, and then add a pinch of 
cayenne. The drink would produce “a rather considerable 
sting and an after-effect of warmth” that saloon patrons 
craved ( Soda Fountain , 1919: 39). 
 Altered Competitive Landscape 
 As social movement organizations deinstitutionalize existing 
organizational forms by altering the normative, cognitive, and 
regulative environments, they inadvertently reduce barriers to 
entry for new entrepreneurial forms by (a) increasing the 
availability of needed resources, (b) changing the nature of 
relations between sets of organizations, and (c) diminishing 
the ability of competitors to compete. First, when existing 
organizations are deinstitutionalized and fail, the resource 
space associated with the failed fi rms—land, labor, machinery, 
employees, and so forth—becomes available to entrepreneurs, 
typically at a reduced cost. For example, when high-technology 
fi rms failed in the Silicon Valley in the 1980s, displaced 
engineers were quickly hired by surrounding competitors 
or new startups (Saxenian, 1994). As the temperance 
movement succeeded in delegitimating breweries and thus 
spurring their failure, disbanded breweries released 
resources—employees, equipment, assets, supplies, and 
patrons—back into the environment, allowing soft drink 
entrepreneurs to exploit them. Many breweries that closed 
sold their assets to soft drink entrepreneurs at reduced 
prices—ten cents to the dollar in some cases (Feldman, 1927: 
315)—while a very few closed and underwent metamorphic 
changes to convert their machinery and later reopen as soft 
drink producers themselves. For example, the Galveston 
Brewing Company of Galveston, Texas, after sales plummeted 
and local and state temperance regulation intensifi ed, closed 
in 1916. During the next two years, the brewing equipment 
was converted to produce soft drinks, and in 1918, the 
Southern Beverage Company opened its doors with its 
new product, Triple XXX Root Beer (Ehresman and 
Ehresman, 2006). 
 Second, as organizational forms are deinstitutionalized, the 
boundaries defi ning competitive relations and separate 
resource niches between organizational populations often blur 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989), which can cause a shift in how 
existing and emerging forms compete for resources (Aldrich 
and Ruef, 2006). Because the soft drink industry was initially 
identifi ed with pharmacological remedies for everyday 
maladies, many effervescent products could have been 
viewed as complements to beer and other alcoholic drinks as 
cures for the next-day hangover. As breweries became 
deinstitutionalized, however, soft drink producers sought 
opportunities to encroach upon breweries’ markets, thereby 
changing their relationship from symbiotic to competitive. 
This is exemplifi ed by Charles Hires changing the name of his 
product from “root tea” to “root beer” and packaging the 
product in kegs in an attempt to lure away beer consumers 
(Zott and Huy, 2007). 
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 Third, as organizational forms are deinstitutionalized, their 
ability to defend their product space is severely weakened. 
When a form and the industry associations that support and 
promote that form become less legitimate, they are less able 
to persuade potential and current customers, investors, or 
retailers of the value, utility, and overall quality of the product. 
In this case, once alcohol was deemed and accepted to be a 
health and moral concern, both individual beer manufacturers 
and the national brewers association had diffi culty convincing 
the public that beer was a higher quality beverage (i.e., 
healthier) than soft drinks. As breweries lost their legitimacy, 
they also lost the ability to make credible defensive 
arguments to protect their product space. 
 The soft drink industry grew rapidly as the WCTU grew in 
size and infl uence. By 1900, there were 2,763 soft drink 
manufacturers collecting more than $23 million dollars in 
revenues (Riley, 1958). These fi rms offered a variety of new 
soft drinks, such as birch beer, spruce beer, hop beer, ginger 
beer, and colas ( Beverage World , 1982). By 1919, total sales 
revenues surpassed $135 million (Riley, 1958). Thus, as the 
WCTU’s strategies succeeded in creating demand for 
substitutes to alcohol, inspiring both value-driven and more 
purely opportunistic entrepreneurs to create new products 
and in causing breweries to fail (thereby making resources 
available to both sets of entrepreneurs), they created a 
competitive environment favorable to the founding of soft 
drink fi rms. Increases in the presence of WCTU members in a 
state, who were pledged not only to refrain from drink 
themselves but also to proselytize such abstention among 
others, should create increasing normative pressure on 
individuals to at least have substitutes for alcoholic beverages 
available (a market pull). Such environments were also more 
likely to foster value-driven entry into the soft drink industry 
by entrepreneurs (an ideological push). Thus we posit: 
 Hypothesis 4: Increases in the proportion of WCTU members in a 
state will increase soft drink fi rm foundings. 
 Similarly, insofar as scientifi c temperance instruction was 
effective in its efforts to persuade people of the social and 
physical harms that were associated with drinking, its 
cumulative effects should be the creation of a relatively large 
number of individuals who were unlikely to consume alcohol 
and therefore would be receptive to alternative beverages for 
celebratory and social occasions. The presence of such a 
market would be likely to encourage more opportunistic 
entrepreneurs to enter the soft drink industry (a market pull). 
 Hypothesis 5: State adoption of scientifi c temperance instruction 
will increase soft drink fi rm foundings. 
 The reduced availability of alcoholic beverages that 
accompanied the passage of prohibitory regulation should 
also increase the number of individuals who would seek an 
alternative, legal drink to replace alcohol. Like scientifi c 
temperance instruction, this could be expected to encourage 
entrepreneurs to enter the soft drink industry to meet 
demand (again, market pull). 
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 Hypothesis 6: The passage of prohibition regulation by counties and 
states will increase soft drink fi rm foundings. 
 Finally, the failure of breweries could be expected to result 
both in making additional resources available to soft drink 
entrepreneurs and opening up new markets for their products 
(altered competitive landscape). Thus we hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 7: Net of the effects of the proportion of WCTU 
 membership, scientifi c temperance instruction programs, and 
prohibition regulation, brewery failures will increase soft drink fi rm 
foundings in a focal state. 
 METHODS 
 We focused on the intended and unintended effects of different 
WCTU tactics on breweries and soft drink organizations at the 
state level. The window of observation is 1870 to 1920. We 
used 1870 as the base year because that was the decade in 
which soft drink producers began to distinguish themselves 
from mineral water producers, and 1920 is the end year 
because that is the year U.S. federal law prohibiting the sale of 
alcohol for individual consumption (a WCTU triumph) went into 
effect. Although there were other contemporary temperance 
social movement organizations such as the Anti-Saloon League 
and the Prohibition Party, we focused on the WCTU for three 
key reasons. First, it was by far the largest and most powerful. 
In addition, it employed a variety of tactics in its efforts to stop 
the consumption of alcohol, allowing us to compare their 
relative effects; the other temperance organizations 
concentrated largely on legislative strategies (see Donovan, 
1994). And, fi nally, data on the other social movement 
organizations are much more limited, perhaps because they 
were smaller and/or less long-lived than the WCTU. 
 Data and Measures 
 Dependent variables . We obtained data on soft drink 
producers from Fewless and Weide’s (2009)  Soft Drink Bottlers 
of the United States , which provides information on over 
20,000 soft drink bottlers, including the founding date, address, 
ownership, date of failure, and products. From this dataset, we 
were able to calculate for each state-year the number of soft 
drink manufacturer foundings and the number of soft drink 
manufacturers in operation. Although all of the bottlers during 
our study’s time period were independently owned and 
operated, roughly 13 percent of the bottlers in our sample were 
manufacturing soft drinks under franchise contracts. During the 
industry’s early years, major companies such as Pepsi-Cola, 
Coca-Cola, Chero-Cola, Moxie, and Hires signed franchise 
agreements with independent bottlers to manufacture their 
product. Both because franchise fi rms constitute a very small 
part of our sample, and because there is no evidence that they 
differed systematically from others, we included them in our 
analyses. In the 10 states for which we had suffi ciently detailed 
data to identify transitions from brewery to soft drink 
manufacturer, the transition rate was 3.1 percent. 
 Data on American breweries came from Van Wieren’s (1995) 
 American Breweries II , which lists the year of founding and 
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failure for each brewery, and have been used in previous 
research on the American brewery industry (Barnett, 1997; 
Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998). The brewery dataset 
contains the name of the company, the date it was founded, 
its address, and the date of failure. We assigned each 
brewery a value of 1 for each year that it was in operation, 
and 0 for the year that it failed, if this occurred. Because our 
period of analysis begins in 1870 and the fi rst brewery was 
founded in 1633, the data in our event history analysis are 
left-censored. To verify that left-censoring was not an issue, 
we ran the hazard model with a dummy variable for all 
breweries that were left-censored and found that it did not 
change the results. 
 Key predictor variables . To measure regulatory effects, we 
obtained information on the passage of county- and state-
level prohibition laws between 1801 and 1920 from a public-
use dataset compiled by Sechrist (1985). For states that had 
not passed statewide laws, we measured the proportion of 
counties that had passed such laws; when states passed 
laws applying to all counties, this measure became coded as 
1. We measured the normative pressures created by the 
WCTU using the annual number of dues-paying members of 
local chapters (unions) in each state divided by the total state 
population. 2 These data came from the  Minutes of the 
Convention of the National Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union (1874–1920). To assess the interactive effects of other 
sources of normative pressure for temperance, such as 
prohibition laws in surrounding states and the American 
Medical Association, we included a measure of the 
percentage of all counties in adjoining states that had enacted 
state and county prohibition laws as well as a measure of the 
number of American Medical Association members per 
state. 3 Unlike the WCTU membership proportion measure, 
which gauged normative infl uence, we used counts of AMA 
members in order to capture the amount of resources 
available for lobbying and temperance endorsement. 4 
Information on AMA state membership and WCTU support 
came from the  Transactions of the American Medical 
Association (1869–1920). 
 We captured cognitive institutional effects by measuring the 
number of years a state had in place mandatory scientifi c 
temperance instruction (STI). Once a state mandated STI, the 
passage of time should result in a progressively larger 
proportion of the population that had received pro-temperance 
instruction (Collins, 1994). Following past research on 
individual learning (Epple, Argote, and Devadas, 1991), we 
measured STI using a variable that measures the logged 
accumulative time in each state since STI was enacted. Data 
on STI came from the  Minutes of the Convention of the 
National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (1874–1920). 
 Control variables. We controlled for the demand for beer 
using the number of Irish and German immigrants in each 
state. For cultural reasons, these groups generally consumed 
more beer than other ethnic groups; they also opposed 
temperance (Sechrist, 1986). Furthermore, WCTU ideologies 
in many cases resounded best with Protestant doctrine 
2
In analyses not reported here, we also 
used the raw number of WCTU members 
and found similar results.
3
We also examined other kinds of 
interstate dynamics, such as the 
percentage of WCTU members and 
scientifi c temperance instruction in 
surrounding states, but these did not alter 
the main effects.
4
The AMA’s potent infl uence on individual 
beliefs and state policy was very much a 
product of its ability to harness revenue in 
the form of dues from its members. In 
line with this, in analyses not reported 
here, we also interacted the proportion of 
AMA members with the proportion of 
WCTU members and found no signifi cant 
impact.
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(Gusfi eld, 1986; Mezvinsky, 1959), and “most Irish 
immigrants and a large percentage of German immigrants 
were Catholic” (Miller, 1995: 19). To address possible social 
class effects, we controlled for state taxable wealth, which 
includes all taxable individual and organizational property and 
assets. We also controlled for the number of manufacturing 
establishments per state. Temperance women considered 
manufacturing fi rms to be a key contributor to alcohol 
consumption because they paid employee wages on 
Saturdays and created strenuous and dangerous work 
environments (WCTU  Minutes , 1874). We also controlled for 
state population. We obtained data on population, immigrants, 
state wealth, and manufacturing fi rms from the U.S. 
decennial censuses (1870–1920) and assumed a constant 
yearly compound growth rate over each decade to make 
annual estimates. Because not all of the states in our analysis 
were formed as states at the start of the analysis, we 
included a dummy variable to distinguish between states and 
territories in supplementary analyses. The territory dummy 
variable was not signifi cant, nor did it change the models’ 
results. 
 We also controlled for the effects of suffrage laws by 
including a dummy variable coded 1 in states passing such 
laws. The temperance movement was closely affi liated with 
the suffrage movement (McCammon and Campbell, 2002), 
and women who were able to convince male voters to enact 
suffrage laws in a state may have also had enough support 
and power to close brewery doors. Information on state 
suffrage laws came from the National American Woman 
Suffrage Association (1940). 
 In addition, we included state-level brewery density measures 
in the analysis of brewery failures as well as the change in 
brewery density in the analysis of the soft drink foundings 
to control for beer demand. Correspondingly, the analysis 
of soft drink foundings included density measures for soft 
drink producers. Following previous work (e.g., Wade, 
Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998), we included measures of 
industry and organizational age as well. We modeled brewery 
industry age as the time since the fi rst brewery was founded 
in the American colonies in 1633, and soft drink industry age 
was modeled as the time from when the fi rst “soft drink” (as 
opposed to effervescent) producer was founded in the United 
States in 1876. We modeled brewery organizational age as 
the time from when an individual brewery was founded. 
These variables control for other changes that may have 
occurred linearly with the passage of time. 
 Finally, we controlled for the enactment of the Pure Food and 
Drug Act of 1906 by including a dummy variable, coded 0 
before this time period, and 1 thereafter. This act forbade 
interstate and foreign commerce of adulterated and 
misbranded food and drugs and, prior to 1906, many soft 
drink producers were still claiming medicinal benefi ts for their 
products, some lacing their products with unproven and 
untested chemicals. Thus the act’s passage could be 
expected to have a negative impact on soft drink producers. 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are provided in 
table 1. 
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Table 1
Bivariate Correlations and Variable Summary
Variable Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 1. State population 3174956 2371451
 2. German and Irish 
immigrants 288564 266536 .744
 3. Number of 
manufacturing 
establishments 17738 18007 .639 .855
 4. State taxable 
wealth 4920000000 5260000000 .888 .521 .368
 5. State suffrage 0.061 0.239 .023 −.130 −.117 .290
 6. Pure Food and 
Drug Act 0.234 0.423 .276 −.136 −.339 .513 .358
 7. AMA membership 867.161 1042.825 .837 .395 .279 .950 .238 .552
 8. Prohibition 
percentage of 
surrounding states 0.235 0.236 .118 −.098 −.148 .293 .405 .541 .268
 9. Soft drink producer 
density 49.485 68.923 .209 .020 −.110 .313 .117 .386 .372 .273
10. Brewery density 143.578 104.372 .555 .741 .698 .290 −.224 −.258 .150 −.138 .078
11. Soft drink 
industry age 17.226 13.673 .336 −.111 −.170 .549 .369 .789 .672 .432 .430
12. Brewery 
industry age 259.863 14.170 .335 −.108 −.164 .544 .362 .776 .667 .416 .426
13. Brewery 
organizational age 18.628 13.487 .290 −.004 −.062 .417 .188 .530 .507 .240 .350
14. Brewery failures 5.720 9.169 .234 .258 .278 .167 −.007 −.089 .074 .036 .041
15. Soft drink 
foundings 5.908 17.117 .151 .032 .021 .210 .088 .152 .225 .213 .622
16. WCTU proportion 0.195 0.372 .330 .014 .008 .449 .179 .491 .568 .227 .238
17. Scientifi c 
temperance 
instruction 1.290 1.401 .436 .046 .046 .574 .273 .582 .679 .288 .082
18. Prohibition 
percentage (focal 
state) 0.163 0.334 −.047 −.251 −.191 .081 .287 .285 .050 .338 .028
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
11. Soft drink industry 
age −.350
12. Brewery industry 
age −.341 .997
13. Brewery 
organizational age −.192 .698 .701
14. Brewery failures .490 −.156 −.149 −.115
15. Soft drink 
foundings .042 .171 .170 .106 .138
16. WCTU proportion −.206 .722 .725 .536 −.090 .118
17. Scientifi c 
temperance 
instruction −.224 .800 .796 .525 −.117 .074 .658
18. Prohibition 
percentage 
(focal state) −.261 .176 .166 .080 .028 .134 .070 .096
 Analysis 
 In the analysis of failures, our unit of analysis is the individual 
brewery. To assess the effects of the predictor variables on 
rates of failure, we used piecewise exponential hazards 
models. These models do not require strong parametric 
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assumptions of a constant failure rate over the entire study’s 
span but, instead, allow the hazard rate to change at multiple 
intervals, allowing for greater fl exibility (Blossfeld and 
Rohwer, 1995). The model has the following general form: 
 r(t) = exp(α i + βα) 
 where α i is a constant coeffi cient associated with the ith time 
interval, β is a row vector of covariates, and α is an associated 
vector of coeffi cients. We estimated our piecewise failure 
model with period effects in fi ve-year intervals. In determining 
the time periods, it is important to choose time segments that 
are short enough to capture changes in the baseline hazard rate 
but long enough to capture enough failure events (Blossfeld, 
Golsch, and Rohwer, 2007). We chose fi ve-year time periods 
because we felt they were best for approximating changes in 
the baseline rate as well as avoiding estimation problems that 
may occur from too few ending episodes within the time 
period. The piecewise exponential model generates a period-
specifi c constant (a y-intercept) for each designated time piece 
of the model. We used maximum likelihood estimation and 
the Huber-White-sandwich estimator of variance, which 
clusters observations on organizations, to produce robust 
standard errors. 
 In the analysis of foundings, the dependent variable is the 
number of soft drink producer foundings in a state in a given 
year. Because the dependent variable is a count measure, and 
because tests indicated that our measure was characterized 
by overdispersion (making the use of a Poisson model 
inappropriate), we used a fi xed-effects negative binomial 
model, which addresses the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as overdispersion (Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches, 1984). The model we estimated with the  xtnbreg 
command in Stata has the following form: 
 λ ij (θ i ) = exp(x ij β) θ i 
 where λ ij is the predicted foundings in state i in year j, x ij  is 
the vector of independent variables and coeffi cients for state i 
and year j, and θ i is a constant dispersion parameter within 
the group. 
 Some of our variables, such as brewery density and 
brewery density squared, were highly correlated, and such 
multicollinearity infl ates standard errors and makes regression 
coeffi cients unstable. To address this, we used the Gram-
Schmidt procedure for orthogonalizing highly correlated 
variables (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Saville and Wood, 
1991), which partials out the common variance and creates 
transformed variables that are uncorrelated with each 
other. Using the  orthog command in Stata, we generated 
orthogonalized measures for the highly correlated interaction 
variables of WCTU proportion and prohibition percentage 
in surrounding states, and WCTU proportion and AMA 
membership. We also generated an orthogonalized variable 
of brewery density to reduce correlation with brewery density 
squared and an orthogonalized variable of soft drink density 
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squared to reduce correlation with soft drink density. We then 
tested for multicollinearity and found that all variance-infl ation 
factors in the survival analysis were less than 8.35 and that 
the majority were less than 3.36, while in the negative 
binomial analysis, variance-infl ation factors were less than 
8.52, and the majority were less than 3.56, indicating an 
acceptable level of multicollinearity (Afi fi , Clark, and May, 
2004). 
 RESULTS 
 The results of the hazard models predicting brewery failure 
are provided in table 2. The fi rst model contains only the 
control variables; the second adds the proportion of WCTU 
members in a state; the third model includes the STI measure 
with the control variables; the fourth model contains the 
measure of prohibition laws in a state with the control 
variables, and the fi fth model includes all of the tactic 
measures with the controls. Models 6 and 7 include, 
respectively, all measures plus the interaction term for WCTU 
proportion and prohibition percentage of surrounding states, 
and all measures plus the interaction between WCTU 
proportion and AMA membership. Model 8 includes all the 
variables plus the interaction terms. 
 Across models, several control variables had a signifi cant 
effect on breweries’ survival. The rate of brewery failure was 
lower in states with more manufacturing establishments and 
greater taxable wealth, suggesting that demand for alcohol 
was more resilient in more industrialized and wealthier areas, 
all else being equal. The rate was also lower in states in 
which a large percentage of surrounding counties and states 
had enacted prohibitory laws, consistent with previous 
research positing positive spillover effects of freed-up 
resources and lessened competitive pressure (Wade, 
Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998). Although this is inconsistent 
with our speculations on the normative infl uences of adjoining 
state legislation, it is possible that such legislation had both 
resource spillover and normative effects on breweries in a 
focal state, the former enhancing survival but the latter 
weakening it. If the resource spillover effects are stronger, 
the overall effect on breweries would be positive, as these 
results suggest. This interpretation is consistent with the 
interactive effects of this variable, as discussed below. Our 
indicator of progressive state environments, the presence of 
state suffrage laws, is associated with increased brewery 
failure. In accordance with density-dependence arguments, 
increases in brewery density decreased failure up to a point, 
after which increasing density increased failure rates. 
Organizational age also decreased the hazard rate. 
 Turning to our main interest, the effects of the measures of 
WCTU tactics, the positive coeffi cients for the measure of 
proportion of WCTU members provide support for hypothesis 
1a: increases in the proportion of WCTU members in a state 
signifi cantly increased the failure rate for breweries. In 
models 6 and 7, both the interaction between the proportion 
of WCTU members in a state and the percentage of 
surrounding states with prohibition laws, and that between 
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Table 2
Hazard Rate Models of Individual Brewery Failures, 1870–1920*
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
1870–1875† −51.753 −51.706 −50.702 −51.126 −50.136 −49.694 −49.418 −49.4021
(2.959) (2.959) (2.973) (2.962) (2.974) (2.979) (3.001) (3.000)
1876–1880 −53.098 −53.051 −52.034 −52.429 −51.429 −50.988 −50.689 −50.6783
(3.021) (3.020) (3.034) (3.024) (3.036) (3.040) (3.063) (3.063)
1881–1885 −53.516 −53.473 −52.436 −52.812 −51.802 −51.355 −51.047 −51.0378
(3.078) (3.077) (3.092) (3.081) (3.093) (3.098) (3.122) (3.121)
1886–1890 −54.767 −54.738 −53.752 −54.019 −53.083 −52.642 −52.350 −52.338
(3.142) (3.141) (3.155) (3.144) (3.156) (3.160) (3.183) (3.183)
1891–1895 −55.734 −55.716 −54.770 −54.936 −54.058 −53.603 −53.310 −53.2959
(3.214) (3.213) (3.225) (3.217) (3.226) (3.230) (3.253) (3.253)
1896–1900 −56.921 −56.896 −55.983 −56.081 −55.223 −54.750 −54.451 −54.4351
(3.268) (3.267) (3.278) (3.271) (3.280) (3.284) (3.308) (3.307)
1901–1905 −57.763 −57.731 −56.858 −56.929 −56.094 −55.611 −55.303 −55.2866
(3.328) (3.327) (3.337) (3.332) (3.340) (3.345) (3.369) (3.369)
1906–1910 −58.696 −58.667 −57.813 −57.917 −57.104 −56.626 −56.316 −56.3019
(3.386) (3.385) (3.395) (3.390) (3.398) (3.403) (3.427) (3.426)
1911–1915 −59.440 −59.416 −58.524 −58.680 −57.839 −57.379 −57.063 −57.0532
(3.442) (3.441) (3.451) (3.445) (3.452) (3.456) (3.479) (3.479)
1916–1920 −59.773 −59.754 −58.787 −59.069 −58.164 −57.726 −57.396 −57.3935
(3.491) (3.490) (3.502) (3.495) (3.504) (3.507) (3.531) (3.531)
State 
population/
1,000,000
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
German and 
Irish 
immigrants/
1,000,000
−0.225
(0.179)
−0.231
(0.179)
−0.100
(0.181)
−0.065
(0.181)
0.037
(0.183)
0.077
(0.185)
0.074
(0.185)
0.083
(0.185)
Number of 
manufacturing 
establishments/
10,000
−0.054•
(0.032)
−0.053•
(0.032)
−0.086•••
(0.033)
−0.075••
(0.032)
−0.102•••
(0.033)
−0.104•••
(0.033)
−0.104•••
(0.033)
−0.104•••
(0.033)
State taxable 
wealth
−2.649•
(1.363)
−2.699••
(1.364)
−4.097•••
(1.430)
−1.797
(1.361)
−3.203••
(1.429)
−2.994••
(1.448)
−3.373••
(1.446)
−3.244••
(1.452)
State suffrage 0.313••• 0.313••• 0.321••• 0.283••• 0.294••• 0.293••• 0.305••• 0.302•••
(0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084)
AMA 
membership 
by state (log)
0.010
(0.022)
0.011
(0.022)
0.020
(0.022)
−0.005
(0.022)
0.006
(0.023)
0.008
(0.023)
0.028
(0.025)
0.023
(0.026)
Prohibition laws 
in adjoining 
states
−0.375•••
(0.108)
−0.365•••
(0.108)
−0.417•••
(0.108)
−0.360•••
(0.108)
−0.390•••
(0.108)
−0.320•••
(0.119)
−0.374•••
(0.109)
−0.349•••
(0.121)
Brewery 
density
−0.098•••
(0.020)
−0.099•••
(0.020)
−0.083•••
(0.020)
−0.104•••
(0.020)
−0.091•••
(0.020)
−0.094•••
(0.020)
−0.101•••
(0.020)
−0.100•••
(0.021)
Brewery 
density 
squared
0.000•••
(0.000)
0.000•••
(0.000)
0.000•••
(0.000)
0.000•••
(0.000) 0.000•••
(0.000)
0.000•••
(0.000)
0.000•••
(0.000)
0.000•••
(0.000)
Industry 
age
0.205•••
(0.012)
0.204•••
(0.012)
0.200•••
(0.012)
0.202•••
(0.012)
0.198•••
(0.012)
0.196•••
(0.012)
0.194•••
(0.013)
0.194•••
(0.013)
Organizational 
age
−0.032•••
(0.002)
−0.032•••
(0.002)
−0.031•••
(0.002)
−0.033•••
(0.002)
−0.032•••
(0.002)
−0.032•••
(0.002)
−0.032•••
(0.002)
−0.032•••
(0.002)
WCTU 
member 
proportion × 
1000
0.071•••
(0.027)
0.064••
(0.028)
0.096•••
(0.040)
0.098•••
(0.035)
0.104•••
(0.038)
(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Hazard Rate Models of Individual Brewery Failures, 1870–1920*
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Scientifi c 
temperance 
instruction
0.111•••
(0.027)
0.102•••
(0.027)
0.096•••
(0.027)
0.095•••
(0.027)
0.095•••
(0.027)
State 
prohibition
0.294•••
(0.055)
0.283•••
(0.055)
0.280•••
(0.055)
0.297•••
(0.055)
0.293•••
(0.056)
WCTU 
member 
proportion × 
Prohibition 
laws in 
adjoining 
states
0.038•
(0.022)
0.053•
(0.030)
WCTU member 
proportion × 
AMA 
membership
0.045••
(0.022)
0.061••
(0.030)
Wald chi 
squared
36266.18•••  36267.75••• 36221.11••• 36456.75••• 36383.81••• 36490.25••• 36413.49••• 36493.53•••
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses.
† Estimates of signifi cance are not shown for the time-period dummies because those coeffi cients are not tested for 
signifi cance.
the proportion of WCTU members and the number of AMA 
members are signifi cant and positive, indicating that the 
normative power of the WCTU was further enhanced under 
these conditions, consistent with hypotheses 1b and 1c. 
Using a standard conversion formula—Exp(S.D. coeffi cient)—
and the coeffi cient from model 5, we estimate that an 
increase of one standard deviation in the proportion of WCTU 
members in a state increased the likelihood of brewery failure 
by 3.9 percent. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in 
the log of AMA membership interacting with the effect of 
WCTU membership increased the likelihood of failure by 6.3 
percent. And as surrounding states increased their adoption 
of prohibition laws, the normative effect of WCTU 
membership proportion also grew; a one standard deviation 
increase in surrounding states’ adoption of prohibition laws 
strengthened the normative effect of the WCTU on brewery 
failures by 5.4 percent. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that scientifi c temperance instruction 
would also increase the rate of brewery failures; in line with 
this, the coeffi cient for this measure is signifi cant and positive 
across models. Using the coeffi cient from model 5, we 
estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the length 
of time that STI was mandated increased the probability of 
brewery failure by 14.2 percent. 
 Similarly, hypothesis 3, predicting that having a greater 
number of counties with prohibition laws would increase 
brewery failures in a state, receives strong support across the 
models. Based on the coeffi cient in model 5, a one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of counties with 
prohibition laws in a state augmented brewery failures by 
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10.3 percent. Despite the relatively high correlation between 
the proportion of WCTU members in a state and the time of 
STI implementation (r = .66), all three tactic measures have 
signifi cant independent effects. Given the standard deviation 
increase calculations, it appears that STI and WCTU 
membership had the strongest direct net effect on brewery 
failures. 5 
 Table 3 shows the results from the negative binomial 
regressions predicting the foundings of soft drink producers. 
The fi rst model contains only control variables, models 2–5 
each add separate measures of WCTU effects, and the fi nal 
model contains all variables. As in the preceding analysis, 
there are a few notable effects of the control variables. States 
with full suffrage rights and those that were surrounded by 
other states with prohibition laws experienced more soft drink 
producer foundings, while states with larger populations, 
larger numbers of Irish and German immigrants, and more 
AMA members had fewer soft drink foundings. Given that the 
AMA was extremely antagonistic toward “patent medicines,” 
many of which were marketed as or eventually became 
known as soft drinks (see AMA, 1920: 8), the negative effect 
of this measure on soft drink foundings is not surprising. 
Generally, increases in the density of soft drink fi rms increased 
foundings, though the negative quadratic term suggests that 
at some point, competitive pressures began to take their toll 
on foundings; this is consistent with standard ecological 
arguments. The passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act had a 
strong negative impact on foundings. This is also unsurprising, 
because ingredients used by many soft drink experimenters 
were banned with the passage of this law. 
 Net of these infl uences, two of the three measures of WCTU 
infl uence—the length of STI in a state and the proportion of 
counties with prohibition laws—had signifi cant, positive 
effects on the rates of foundings. In line with hypothesis 5, 
the longer a state had had STI in its educational curriculum, 
the greater the number of foundings. Similarly, as posited by 
hypothesis 6, states with a greater proportion of counties with 
prohibition laws were likely to have signifi cantly more 
foundings. A one standard deviation increase in the proportion 
of prohibition laws in a state amplifi ed soft drink foundings by 
12.6 percent. Likewise, as posited in hypothesis 5, an increase 
of one standard deviation in the length of STI implementation 
augmented the founding rate by 12.3 percent. In combination, 
these results support the general argument that the potential 
market for alcohol substitutes created both by persuading 
individuals of the evils of drinking and by regulation helped 
inspire entrepreneurs to found soft drink companies. And in 
line with hypothesis 7, brewery failures also had a signifi cant 
impact on the founding rate of soft drink bottlers. Our data 
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in brewery 
failure raised soft drink foundings by 14.7 percent. 
 Contrary to expectations, the proportion of WCTU members 
did not have a signifi cant impact on soft drink foundings in a 
state. Hence, the direct effect of the WCTU on soft drink 
foundings was negligible. Nevertheless, by causing breweries 
to fail and by creating a demand for substitutes for alcoholic 
5
These strategies are apt to be causally 
related (e.g., the size of the WCTU’s 
membership at early time points may 
have affected the timing of adoption of 
scientifi c temperance instruction as well 
as the passage of prohibition legislation). 
We did not assess these relationships 
here because our main concern was with 
understanding how the different 
strategies affected both the intended and 
unintended outcomes—the demise of 
breweries and the creation of soft drink 
fi rms—rather than the interrelations 
among the strategies per se.
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Table 3
Negative Binomial Regression Models of State-level Soft Drink Foundings, 1870–1920*
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
State population (log) −0.464••• −0.445••• −0.476••• −0.535••• −0.509••• −0.553•••
(0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.134) (0.126) (0.136)
German and Irish 
immigrants 
(counts)/
1,000,000
−2.355•••
(0.513)
−2.636•••
(0.520)
−2.254•••
(0.520)
−2.231•••
(0.515)
−2.136•••
(0.512)
−2.286•••
(0.526)
Number of 
manufacturing 
establishments/
10,000
−0.019
(0.048)
−0.036
(0.048)
−0.019
(0.048)
0.001
(0.048)
−0.041
(0.047)
−0.032
(0.048)
State taxable 
wealth
−0.019•
(0.010)
−0.012
(0.010)
−0.018•
(0.010)
−0.022••
(0.010)
−0.013
(0.009)
−0.010
(0.010)
State suffrage 0.692••• 0.668••• 0.696••• 0.689••• 0.638••• 0.619•••
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093)
Pure Food and 
Drug Act
−0.560•••
(0.052)
−0.569•••
(0.052)
−0.559•••
(0.052)
−0.565•••
(0.052)
−0.594•••
(0.052)
−0.611•••
(0.053)
AMA membership 
by state (log)
−0.355•••
(0.069)
−0.340•••
(0.070)
−0.381•••
(0.073)
−0.364•••
(0.070)
−0.332•••
(0.069)
−0.360•••
(0.074)
Prohibition laws in 
adjoining states
0.433•••
(0.119)
0.430•••
(0.119)
0.389•••
(0.119)
0.395•••
(0.119)
0.242•
(0.127)
0.177
(0.127)
Change in brewery 
density
0.000
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
Soft drink 
density (log)
1.737•••
(0.042)
1.719•••
(0.043)
1.740•••
(0.043)
1.762•••
(0.043)
1.727•••
(0.043)
1.734•••
(0.044)
Soft drink density 
squared (log)
−0.016•
(0.008)
−0.016•
(0.008)
−0.016••
(0.008)
−0.016•
(0.008)
−0.018••
(0.008)
−0.018••
(0.008)
Industry age (log) 0.128• 0.121• 0.213••• 0.092 0.113 0.148•
(0.072) (0.073) (0.076) (0.073) (0.071) (0.078)
Brewery failure 0.013••• 0.015•••
(0.003) (0.004)
WCTU member 
proportion × 1000
−0.154
(0.206)
−0.015
(0.211)
Scientifi c temperance 
instruction
0.091•••
(0.035)
0.089••
(0.038)
State prohibition 0.377••• 0.354•••
(0.092) (0.093)
Constant 3.986•• 3.704•• 4.082•• 4.909••• 4.570••• 5.082•••
(1.603) (1.600) (1.643) (1.698) (1.599) (1.724)
Wald chi 
squared
2002.04••• 2098.32••• 2022.47••• 2010.35••• 2012.40••• 2123.97•••
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses.
beverages, WCTU members’ tactics inadvertently and 
indirectly fostered soft drink foundings. We also searched for 
effects of soft drink foundings on brewery failures but did not 
fi nd any. This suggests that soft drink fi rms simply moved into 
the void created by lessened alcohol use and its outright ban. 
Thus the direct infl uence of soft drink fi rms on the brewery 
industry was insignifi cant compared with that of the WCTU. 
 DISCUSSION 
 In this paper, we examined both the intended and unintended 
consequences of social movement tactics for organizations. 
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By attacking the normative, regulative, and cognitive basis of 
the brewery industry, the WCTU intentionally instigated its 
demise. The decline of the industry, in conjunction with 
changing norms and attitudes cultivated by the WCTU, 
produced an additional outcome that was  not intended, the 
creation of new entrepreneurial opportunities, resulting in the 
emergence and growth of the soft drink industry. The 
demand for alternatives to alcohol created by the WCTU’s 
activities led entrepreneurs with varying motivations to exploit 
this opportunity. Interestingly, our analyses indicate that the 
WCTU’s cognitive and normative efforts to delegitimate 
breweries were most fruitful in causing brewery failures, 
suggesting that such tactics can be very effective for social 
movement organizations. 
 This paper makes several key theoretical contributions. First, 
few empirical studies have analyzed the mechanisms by which 
social movement organizations both directly and indirectly 
affect rates of organizational failure and formation. A number of 
recent studies have investigated how general cultural shifts 
produced by social movements can affect the growth or 
decline of specifi c organizational forms (Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 2000; Ingram and Rao, 2004; Ruef, 2004; 
Haveman, Rao, and Parachuri, 2007; Schneiberg, King, and 
Smith, 2008), but none have compared the effects of different 
tactics that movements use in bringing about these shifts. In 
this analysis, we investigated three tactics that social 
movement organizations can use to change different 
dimensions of institutional environments—promoting 
behavioral norms, educating the populace, and lobbying for 
regulation—and their effects on rates of organizational failures 
and foundings. Unlike some work at the intersection of social 
movement and organizational theory, our study treats 
movement mobilization not simply as a function of opportunity 
structures or industry characteristics (Carroll and Swaminathan, 
2000; Soule and Olzak, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004), but as 
an independent force for institutional change. Thus social 
movement organizations not only respond to political and 
economic opportunities, they can also create them. 
 Our analysis considers the effectiveness of different types of 
tactics in a particular industry at a particular point in time; it 
does not address how the effectiveness of social movement 
organizations might be moderated by characteristics of the 
targets (e.g., industries or organizations) of social movement 
activity. For example, in the late 1880s, the brewery industry 
was composed of thousands of small, independent 
businesses. This fragmentation of the industry may account 
for its lack of success in refuting the WCTU’s attacks. In 
contrast, multiple attacks by anti-smoking advocates such as 
the American Cancer Society on the tobacco industry—a 
consolidated industry with a few very large players—have had 
limited success in recent decades. Research that probes the 
moderating effects of industry structure on the ability of social 
movements to instigate change is needed. 
 Second, our study contributes to the institutional and 
entrepreneurship literatures by examining the role of changes 
From Pabst to Pepsi
661/ASQ, December 2009
in culture, values, and norms in generating new markets and 
creating entrepreneurial opportunities. Traditionally, the 
entrepreneurship literature has focused on the effects of 
exogenous technological innovation “shocks” in producing 
new markets, thus generating entrepreneurial activity 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Garud and 
Kumaraswamy, 1995; Sine and David, 2003; Lavie, 2006), and 
has largely ignored disruptive social shocks instigated by 
social movement organizations as a source of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. By focusing on the efforts of social movement 
organizations to delegitimate certain practices, policies, and 
forms of organization, and on the effects of such efforts on 
the creation of new entrepreneurial opportunities (David, Sine, 
and Haveman, 2009), this research suggests new potential 
lines of research on how such opportunities can be created. 
Emphasizing the cultural change resulting from the 
delegitimation of existing institutions as a source of 
entrepreneurial opportunities draws attention to an important, 
albeit understudied force that can shape the emergence and 
growth of new industries. 
 Future research can build on these fi ndings by examining 
other sources of institutional change that destabilize existing 
organizations and result in entrepreneurial opportunities. For 
example, the spread of evangelical Protestantism or radical 
Islam may alter normative environments in ways that 
adversely affect standard fi nancial institutions and foster the 
proliferation of Christian investment funds and Islamic banks. 
Changing social cognitions about the level and effects of 
contaminants in water from household taps, generated partly 
by claims and concerns of environmental movement 
organizations, can adversely affect the market for some fi rms, 
such as manufacturers of traditional water-coolers, 
and create opportunities for new fi rms, such as producers 
of allegedly pure bottled water. Consideration of such 
infl uences can signifi cantly expand entrepreneurship 
research, which has conventionally focused on how individual 
entrepreneurs seize existing opportunities, neglecting 
the effects of institutional entrepreneurs that disrupt the 
environment of existing organizations and simultaneously 
create new avenues for entrepreneurial activity (Eckhardt 
and Shane, 2003). 
 A third contribution lies in our investigation of the unintended 
consequences of social movement activity for broad-based 
shifts in organizational populations (Giugni, 1999; Haveman, 
Rao, and Parachuri, 2007; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor, 2004). 
Most studies examining the outcome of social movements 
have focused on legislative and policy changes (e.g., Amenta 
and Caren, 2004; Soule and King, 2006; Johnson, 2008), while 
the organizational mechanisms and changes entailed in 
implementing legislation and policy have been largely ignored. 
The few studies that have focused on movements’ effects on 
organizations have been concerned primarily with intended 
changes such as the growth of the grass-fed beef market, the 
creation of insurance cooperatives, and the formation and 
survival of alternative energy producers (e.g., Weber, Heinze, 
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and DeSoucey, 2008; Schneiberg, King, and Smith, 2008; 
Sine and Lee, 2009). By examining the broader cultural and 
institutional changes instigated by movements, we highlight 
how social movements can produce organizational outcomes 
that were not anticipated or intended. 
 The results from this study suggest that the consequences of 
social movements or social movement-like organizations are 
often so expansive that the movement’s members and 
observers cannot foresee their possible adverse effects. 
Though it has long been recognized that social movement 
organizations themselves may be unintentionally transformed 
as a result of their success (Michels, 1962; Tolbert and Hiatt, 
2009), little attention has been given to the idea that the 
achievement of social movement organizations’ goals may 
produce results not at all intended by members. The WCTU 
actively lobbied and promoted values that eventually led to, 
among other things, universal suffrage, child labor laws, and 
reductions in alcoholism (Miron and Zwiebel, 1991; Dills, 
2004). Yet our study suggests that in its efforts to do away 
with the “societal evils” of alcohol, the WCTU ironically and 
inadvertently fostered the emergence of soft drinks, which, 
as a result of successful and sophisticated marketing tactics, 
are now widely consumed by children and have become a 
key contribution to obesity, another problem affecting children 
around the world some seventy years later (Schulze et al., 
2004). This is an adverse consequence that neither Frances 
Willard nor any contemporary WCTU fi gure would have 
wanted or imagined. 
 Although social movements have a variety of both intended 
and unintended effects on organizational populations and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, the longevity and evolving 
nature of these effects remains largely unexplored. In the 
case of breweries, the industry rebounded with vigor after the 
repeal of Prohibition. Both the inoculating effect of failed 
regulation and the subsequent centralization of power within 
the industry make it unlikely that a contemporary social 
movement organization, such as Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (MADD), could ever seriously affect these 
organizations as the WCTU did. But in other sectors, such as 
alterative energy, the impacts of environmental groups on the 
incumbent industry seem to be more long-lived, perhaps 
because of efforts by environmental groups to provide and 
advocate specifi c solutions that both new ventures and 
incumbent utilities could adopt. Important remaining 
questions are why some institutional changes are more 
durable than others, how social movement organizations 
affect the persistence and growth of new industries, and 
whether unintended consequences are more likely when 
social movements fail to offer and promote solutions to the 
problems they attack. Answers to these questions are critical 
to understanding both the long-term intended consequences 
and the unintended consequences of social movements on 
organizations and society. 
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